

Running head: AMERICA AND THE POWER GOAL

Keywords: Implicit nationalism, power, automaticity, American nationalism

The nation as motivation:

America implicitly activates the power goal

Travis J. Carter

University of Chicago

Melissa J. Ferguson

Cornell University

Ran R. Hassin

Hebrew University

Word count =11,291

Manuscript submitted to the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*

PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

Abstract

Findings across 7 experiments show that Americans possess an implicit association between America and the goal for power, such that incidental exposure to American cues automatically activates a general goal for power. Subtle exposure to American cues increased the accessibility and desirability of power, and led to a greater desire for more American power. The implicit association between America and the power goal also led to effects in non-national contexts, including increased importance of high status job attributes, and increased motivated bias when given feedback on a power-related personality test. Although political ideology strongly predicted explicit beliefs about America and power, it did not predict any of the implicit effects of America on power. Instead, the only predictor of the effect of American cues on the desire for power was degree of American news exposure, such that the effects emerged only for those with at least some moderate exposure. This suggests that the implicit association between America and the power goal is formed through media exposure and is independent of explicit beliefs about how America should use its power. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the findings.

The nation as motivation: America implicitly activates the power goal

How do nations influence individuals' behavior? Social psychological research on this question has mostly studied how people's self-reported feelings about their country predict a variety of their attitudes about outgroups, political policies, and current events, for example (e.g., Feshbach, 1987, 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Recently, however, researchers have provided evidence that a nation can also influence its citizens' behavior in subtle and covert ways. Specifically, the information that people automatically associate with a nation in memory influences their attitudes and behavior when they do not realize it, and even when it conflicts with what they would have explicitly wanted (e.g., Carter, Ferguson & Hassin, 2011a; Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski & Gross, 2007). This work opens up interesting questions about how one's nation shapes and guides – in perhaps unnoticed ways – people's everyday thinking, feeling, and behaving.

The current paper tests whether reminders of a nation can go beyond activating simple beliefs or concepts, to changing people's dynamic goals and motivations. Specifically, we examine whether subtle reminders of a nation activate the goal to acquire power, something central to the very definition of a nation. Nations are defined by their autonomy and ability to self-govern (Bernholz, 1985; Hobbes, 1651/1962; Machiavelli, 1532/1997). Precisely because a nation's ability to self-govern is crucial for its operation and survival, scholars across the social sciences have argued that nations will continuously strive to increase their power over other entities (e.g., Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Morgenthau & Thompson, 1950; Weber, 1919/1965). Indeed, scholars have argued that all nations have their own interest at heart, and define national interest in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1973). This perspective from the social science literature raises the interesting possibility that nations themselves might become associated in

people's minds with the quest for power, and if so, any incidental exposure to reminders of one's nation should trigger a basic desire for power.¹ We tested this prediction with regard to the United States of America, and American citizens. In what follows, we consider the operation, development, boundaries, and consequences of this possible association between a nation and the goal of obtaining power.

How a nation influences motivation

Social and cognitive psychological research shows that a particular stimulus (or class of stimuli) can become associated with a wide range of semantic and evaluative information, some of which may be activated immediately and unintentionally upon the mere perception of the stimulus (e.g. Bargh, 2007; Carlston & Smith, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Neely, 1977; Smith & Queller, 2001). This suggests, and recent work has shown, that the perception of national symbols and other political icons can activate a diverse range of knowledge, including attitudes toward the nation, values and beliefs held by the nation and its citizens, exemplars representing the nation, and behaviors and motives related to how a given nation and its citizens do and should act (e.g. Carter et al., 2011a; Ferguson, Carter & Hassin, 2009; Hassin, Ferguson, Kardosh, Porter, Carter & Dudareva, 2009).

Given the ubiquity of national symbols in both public and private life (see Skitka, 2005), it is surprising that researchers have only recently started examining how the mere presence of national symbols may impact our judgments and behaviors without our awareness or consent.

For example, Devos and Banaji (2005) showed that despite explicitly characterizing America as

¹ It is worth noting that we do not believe that exposure to national cues is actually *creating* a goal for power. Rather, it is likely that everyone already possesses this goal to some degree (e.g. Winter, 1973), just as everyone likely has information associated with the nation stored in memory. What we are suggesting is that these two concepts, the goal for power and information associated with the nation, can become implicitly linked in memory, allowing national cues to trigger activation of the goal (see also Bargh, Raymond, Pryor & Strack, 1995).

a cultural and racial melting pot, participants revealed an implicit assumption that the prototypical American is white, and that members of other races are less American. Although explicit exposure to the American flag can lead participants (particularly those high in nationalism) to espouse more egalitarian attitudes (Butz, Plant & Doerr, 2007), more subtle or even subliminal exposure leads to more aggressive beliefs and behaviors in general (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007), as well as more prejudice toward African-Americans and other minorities (Porter, Ferguson, Carter & Hassin, 2012). Additionally, in a more overtly political arena, participants primed with their national flag in Israel, Italy, and Russia became more politically moderate in terms of centrist voting intentions and behavior (Hassin et al., 2007; Hassin et al., 2009). In a similar study conducted in America, Americans primed with their national flag showed more politically conservative beliefs, and were more likely to vote for John McCain (the Republican candidate) over Barack Obama (the Democratic candidate) in the 2008 presidential election (Carter et al., 2011a). What's more, the effect on political attitudes endured for a very long time; compared with the control condition, participants primed with the flag held less positive attitudes toward President Obama and the Republican Party at least 8 months later.

Taken together, this growing body of findings demonstrates that people have various kinds of information implicitly associated with their nation in memory that can be activated unintentionally and nonconsciously by the perception of national symbols, and thus influence subsequent judgments, attitudes, and behaviors (Butz et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2011a, 2011b; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007; Hassin et al., 2007; Kimmelmeir & Winter, 2008; Porter et al., 2012). So far, however, this work has dealt mainly with effects on judgments and behaviors. In the present work, we focus on how the nation might shape and alter people's goals. We examine whether American cues activate the goal to acquire more power, both

personally and nationally. Such an effect would suggest that the unnoticed influence of a nation can be persistent, dynamic, sophisticated, and durable, all of which are characteristics of motivational behavior. It would also connect classical theory in the social sciences on power as the defining characteristic of nations with evidence for the psychological effects of such a link.

How people acquire a nation-power link

How might people acquire an implicit, motivational link between America and the power goal? The acquisition of such a link might seem highly unlikely, given that when citizens of many nations, including America, discuss national policies, agendas, and events, the notion of a national desire for power seems to be rarely explicitly stated. Instead, it seems to be a latent construct, hidden behind the specifics of the particular topic. For example, as pundits consider American foreign military engagements or the economic recession, the discussion typically centers on “promoting democracy” or “saving American jobs” (e.g. Kane, 2011; Keller, March, 2012) rather than on expanding or maintaining American power. And yet, the use of American power to further its interests is at the essence of the debate. In a sense, American Power is the elephant in the room: it is the assumption that underlies the debate, given that the explicitly discussed goals can only be accomplished by powerful nations.

Therefore, despite the seeming latent nature of the discussion of national power, we predict that people extract this underlying relationship between their nation and a desire for power, and that they do so primarily through exposure to the discussion of national issues in the media. Rather than deliberately cultivating this link, we expect it is accomplished passively, in much the same way that people acquire information implicitly (Anderson, C.A., 1983, Anderson, J.R., 1996; Howard & Howard, 1992; Lewicki, 1986; Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewksa, 1992, 1997; Reber, 1989). If this is true, then it should follow that people must have some exposure to this

stream of information, that is, the political news media, in order to develop the association between the nation and a goal for power. News exposure should strengthen and deepen (i.e., automatize) the link through repeated concurrent exposure to those two concepts (see Hebb, 1949; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), eventually allowing national cues to serve as an implicit trigger for the desire for power. Thus, we predict that news exposure will be a crucial moderator in predicting the implicit link between America and a goal for power (see also Carter et al. 2011b; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007). It is also worth noting that, because the link is acquired unintentionally and operates implicitly, it is likely that people would be unhappy with any influence it might exert on their attitudes or behavior (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).

What about explicit beliefs about the use of American power, which tend to be positively related to political conservatism? We predict that the link between the U.S. and power is so pervasive, constant, and reliable, across so many different domains and media forums, that both liberals and conservatives should extract it from the news media. This is akin to the finding that even those who strongly endorse egalitarianism nevertheless often possess negative implicit stereotypes about racial and ethnic stereotypes (e.g. Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio et al., 1995). Even people who espouse a strong commitment to avoid prejudice are nevertheless exposed to all kinds of stereotypical content within the cultural and media portrayal of racial and ethnic groups, and cannot help but be affected by it (e.g., see Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009). In a similar way, we expect that the main predictor for the motivational America-power link is, very simply, how much exposure people have to news about the nation, regardless of a person's explicit endorsement of greater American power (as measured by political affiliation). This suggests that the implicit link between America and the

power goal would be directly opposite to – that is, dissociated from – liberal participants’ explicit beliefs and opinions about America and power. We test directly for these explicit beliefs in Experiment 1, and indirectly in all subsequent experiments. Together, they provide evidence in support of such a dissociation.

Consequences of a nation-power link

We are predicting that people who have some moderate exposure to the national discourse develop an implicit association between the nation and the abstract goal for power, which should translate to effects even in non-national contexts. The rationale is simple: if the relationship that is learned is as abstract as America being associated with the pursuit of power, then making America accessible in the mind should similarly make the power-goal more accessible, which should translate to effects in any context where power is relevant, such as with people’s jobs or interpersonal relationships.

What kinds of effects might an increased desire for power have? Recent research has shown that power, defined as “an individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003, p. 265), can be activated implicitly with effects on a wide variety of behaviors (for reviews, see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003; Smith & Galinsky, 2010). For instance, participants induced into a high power state (or those chronically in high-power states) show greater behavioral approach and action tendencies (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008), are less likely to take the perspectives of, or empathize with, others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006), exhibit more flexible and goal-oriented information processing (Guinote, 2007a, 2007b; Overbeck & Park, 2006), and because power is associated with greater social distance from

others, also process information more abstractly (Smith & Trope, 2006). These general tendencies have considerable downstream consequences, including greater stereotyping of subordinates (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske & Yzerbyt, 2000) and an increased illusion of control over uncontrollable events (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan & Galinsky, 2009), which, in turn, leads to greater optimism and risk-seeking behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; cf. Maner, Gailliot, Butz & Peruche, 2007). Thus, if there is, in fact, an implicit association between America and the goal for power, the downstream effects are both diverse and consequential.

Overview of research

Given the argument developed above, we have three main predictions. First, we predict that the subtle exposure to American cues should activate the goal for power. Second, we predict that this effect should emerge only for those with some exposure to information relevant to the nation's use of power (i.e., the political news media), and should not be moderated by explicit beliefs about power (i.e., political ideology). Third, we predict that the increased desire for power will be general, and not confined to national contexts. We tested these predictions across 7 experiments. We start with a check of our assumptions about explicit beliefs about nations and power. The first experiment confirms that an explicit measure of political ideology strongly predicts explicit support of America gaining more power, but a measure of news exposure does not. In Experiments 2a-b and 3, we test the basic link between American cues and the power goal. Then, in Experiments 4-6, we show the consequences of this link for support of national issues, career aspirations, and self-relevant feedback about personality. In all cases, we test whether the effects depend on news exposure.

We expect that participants will not notice or intend the prime's influence, nor would they suspect it could influence them. A variety of different methodologies were used to prime

participants in an effort to create ecologically valid situations, and assessed suspicion in each experiment. We will return to the issue of suspicion, and especially participants' prior beliefs, in the general discussion.

We selected the American flag as the cue in most of our experiments because, due to its ubiquitous presence in American (and others') culture, it is arguably the most well-known and pre-eminent symbol of the United States (see Butz et al., 2007; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007; Kemmelmeir & Winter, 2008; Skitka, 2005), though we demonstrate empirically that other American cues behave similarly (Experiment 2b). If America is seen as powerful, or is associated with the desire for power, then cues and symbols closely associated with America should denote the same.

Experiment 1: Explicit beliefs about the nation and power

Before examining implicit relationships between America and a power goal, in Experiment 1 we sought to demonstrate two things. First, that exposure to political news, which contains information about the nation's use of power, is not merely an index of explicit endorsement of American power. Second, that political ideology is highly correlated with explicit endorsement of American power, and can thus be used in subsequent experiments as a proxy for that belief, as a way to test whether explicit beliefs are responsible for the effects in subsequent studies. Thus, this first experiment is simply correlational; we asked a sample of participants for their explicit beliefs about American power, their political ideology, and their tendency to follow American political news. If we find the expected pattern of correlations in Experiment 1, then, in the experiments below, when news exposure emerges as a crucial moderator to the implicit nation-power goal link but political ideology does not, we can be fairly certain that the link is indeed implicit, and not merely reminding people of their explicit desire

for America to have more power. To again draw an analogy from the domain of implicit and explicit racial attitudes, work by Weisbuch et al. (2009) demonstrated that exposure to TV shows that contained pro-white (and anti-black) nonverbal behavior increased the implicit prejudice of viewers, even though viewers could not consciously identify bias in the TV shows when they were looking for it. In a similar fashion, because we believe that the extraction of the America-power link from the news media is implicit and orthogonal to explicit beliefs, we predict that news exposure should not positively correlate with explicit beliefs of power, though it will directly predict in our subsequent experiments the strength of the implicit link between America and power. In contrast, we predict that political ideology will be strongly correlated with explicit beliefs about American power, even though in all subsequent experiments it will not moderate the implicit link between America and power.

Methods

Participants. One hundred fifty participants (70 Female, 80 Male) were recruited from Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk Marketplace for a short study on political attitudes. The median age of the sample was 28 ($Mean = 32.02$, $SD = 12.22$). Three participants were removed from the analyses because they were not American citizens.

Materials and procedure. Participants were first asked, "Relative to how much it has now, how much power and influence in the world do you think the United States should have?" (1 = much less, 4 = about the same, 7 = much more). Next, participants indicated how often they followed U.S. political news (1 = rarely, 11 = very frequently), the degree to which they identified as a Republican and a Democrat on separate scales (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal), and their political ideology (1 = liberal, 7 = conservative), and finally provided basic

demographic information (age, gender, citizenship). Age and gender did not influence the results, so they will not be discussed further.

Results and discussion

We first created a composite score of conservatism with party identification and political ideology weighted equally by taking an average of participants' reported ideology and a difference score between their Republican and Democratic identification ($r = .86, p < .001$), centered at zero, and scored such that positive numbers indicate greater conservatism (range -4.5 to +4.5). Our sample was slightly liberal ($M = -1.21, SD = 2.48$), but the full range of the scale was represented.

Participants generally felt that the U.S. should have the same, or slightly more power than it does now ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.27$), one sample t-test against scale midpoint $t(146) = 1.76, p = .08$. More importantly, as predicted, the belief that America should have more power was positively correlated with conservatism ($r = .41, p < .001$). This also holds when comparing participants who scored above and below the scale midpoint (excluding moderate participants), $t(128) = 4.78, p < .001$.

There was a small but significant correlation between news following and the belief that the U.S. should have more power – but in the opposite direction of what one might expect ($r = -.20, p = .014$). That is, participants who closely follow U.S. political news were less likely to advocate for greater U.S. power. There was also a weak negative correlation between news following and conservatism ($r = -.15, p = .08$), but this disappears when controlling for beliefs about U.S. power, $\beta = -.06, t < 1$, and does not hold in the other studies.

Thus, political conservatism positively predicts explicit endorsement of greater American power, but greater exposure to a prominent source of information about the nation's use of power

does not (in fact, the opposite was true). In all of the experiments reported below, it is news following, but not explicit ideology, that predicts implicit effects.

Experiments 2a & 2b: Implicit link between the nation and power

As the first test of these implicit effects, we examined whether there is a basic implicit link between America and power such that exposure to America makes the abstract concept of power more accessible in memory. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants were primed either with an American cue or a control image, and then completed a measure of power-accessibility. Experiment 2a used a subliminal priming procedure, whereas Experiment 2b used a subtle cue at the top of a paper and pencil survey and included a condition using an American cue other than the American flag to determine whether these associations are unique to that symbol.

Experiment 2A

Methods

Participants. Eighty-nine participants (59 Female, 30 Male) completed the experiment in exchange for course credit or \$5. Eight participants reported having seen the subliminal prime, and one participant expressed suspicion of the experimental hypotheses. These participants were removed from the analyses, though including them does not change the pattern or significance of the results.

Procedure and materials. Participants were brought into the laboratory to participate in a study ostensibly investigating the relationship between visual acuity and individual differences in abstract thinking. Upon arriving in the laboratory, participants first completed a media exposure/ideology questionnaire to assess potential individual difference moderators. There were several questions about media exposure, including general television watching, U.S. political news following, watching political news on television, watching Fox News, reading the New

York Times, and watching the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, as well as questions about religiousness, and identification as a socialist or a capitalist, which were all answered on 10 point scales (1 = rarely, 10 = very frequently). Although we assessed exposure to a variety of news sources, we believe that general exposure to political news (rather than any one source) will be the crucial variable, so responses to the single question “How often do you follow U.S. political news on average?” served as our proposed moderator in this and all subsequent studies.²

We also assessed explicit political ideology, with separate questions for identification as Liberal, Conservative, Democrat, Republican and Independent (1 = weak, 7 = strong, 0 = does not apply).³

Next, participants performed 32 trials of the bogus "visual acuity task", which served as our priming measure. For each trial, a grayscale target image featuring either curved or straight lines would display on the screen, and participants would simply determine whether the lines were curved or straight with a key press, as quickly as possible. Immediately before each target image, which served as the backward mask, a grayscale picture of the American flag or a control figure was shown for 17ms.

Then, participants completed the measure of activation of the concept of power, a standard word fragment completion task. The measure consisted of 12 words with 1-3 letters missing, and participants were told to fill in the missing letters to form complete words. Six of these word fragments could either be filled in to form a word related to power, or a word

² Exposure to various specific news sources were always correlated with this more general question, but even composite measures of exposure did not perform as well as this single question in this and all subsequent studies. This suggests that it is specifically political news, and not all types of news, that provides the most information about American power.

³ Political ideology was measured this way in all subsequent studies. In each case, we computed an index by subtracting the sum of the participants' Democrat and Liberal scores from the sum of their Republican and Conservative scores. Because each question was answered on a 0-7 scale, the index had a range of -14 (extremely liberal) to +14 (extremely conservative). Because it was consistently (or theoretically) related to the other measures, we left the Independent scale out this composite measure.

unrelated to power (B_SS: *boss* vs. *bass*; _OWER: *power* vs. *lower*; R_LE: *rule* vs. *role*; CAPT__N: *captain* vs. *caption*; MAS_E_: *master* vs. *masked*; LEA_E_: *leader* vs. *leaves*). The remaining six words were neutral fillers to reduce suspicion of a common theme among the words. In general, the task was designed to be easy (only one or two letters missing) in order to encourage intuitive responding.⁴

Finally, the experimenter used a funnel debriefing to probe for awareness and suspicion of the prime, before debriefing, thanking, and dismissing participants.

Results and Discussion

For each participant, the percentage of the power-related words completed with the power word (as opposed to any other completion) was used as the index of accessibility of the concept of power. There were no significant differences between conditions on any of the individual difference variables assessed on the political ideology/news following questionnaire, including political ideology/affiliation.

In this and all subsequent analyses, all variables were standardized before being entered into linear regressions. There was no main effect of the priming condition, but as predicted, there was a significant interaction between priming condition and news following, $\beta = .460$, $t(76) = 2.14$, $p < .05$. Following the procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991), testing the simple slope of the effect of the flag prime on high and low news followers (at 1 SD above and below the mean; $M = 4.06$, $SD = 2.39$) participants high in news following (+1SD) were significantly more likely to fill in the fragments with power-related words in the flag prime condition compared to the control, $\beta = .773$, $t(76) = 2.53$, $p = .013$, whereas participants low in news following (-1SD) show no difference between conditions, $\beta = -.159$, $t < 1$ (see Figure 1a).

⁴ There was also an exploratory questionnaire unrelated to the present hypothesis, completed after the word fragments task, which will not be discussed here.

One notable caveat to these results is the relatively high proportion of participants in the flag-priming condition who reported seeing the flag. Technical issues appear to have been responsible for the primes being supraliminal for some participants, but it is important to note that we do not believe that subliminality is necessary for an American prime to have an effect. Indeed, when participants who reported seeing the prime were included in the analysis, the results get stronger, if anything.

Experiment 2b

This experiment was designed to replicate the result of Experiment 2a, as well as to test whether the effect extends to other American cues. We used a simple manipulation in this experiment. Participants filled out a paper and pencil survey with grey boxes, American flags, or 'USA' in the top corners of the page. Participants were carefully debriefed at the end of the experiment in order to assess their awareness of the manipulation.

We predict that, relative to the control condition, participants primed with either American cue will show greater accessibility of the concept of power, provided they have some moderate exposure to U.S. political news.

Methods

Participants and procedure. One hundred five participants at a large midwestern university (61 female, 37 male, 7 unspecified) completed the survey.

The survey packet, administered during a break in an unrelated experiment, consisted only of a "Political Interest Survey," which was the same media exposure/ideology questionnaire and word fragment completion task used in Experiment 2a, and a suspicion probe. In the top corners of the "Political Interest Survey," there was a small grey box, a small gray scale

American flag, or ‘USA’ inside a box (all boxes measured 20.6mm x 14.3mm). In the USA condition, the survey title was changed to “American Political Interest Survey” (see Figure 2).

In line with other implicit social cognitive research, the suspicion probe at the end of the packet asked participants what they thought the experiment was about, whether they noticed anything strange about the experiment, if they thought they might have been influenced by anything on the survey or in their immediate surroundings, and whether they noticed anything odd about the survey itself (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).

Results and Discussion

One participant expressed suspicion of the hypothesis, and was removed from the analysis, though including this participant does not change the pattern or significance of the results. Importantly, the priming condition had no effect on the individual difference variables, including news following and political ideology, measured on the first page of the survey. This was true in all subsequent experiments as well.

We performed a linear regression using two contrast-coded condition variables to predict the percentage of power-related words completed.⁵ The first condition variable compared the flag and USA prime conditions (both coded +.5) with the control condition (coded -1), testing the hypothesis that the two priming conditions had a similar influence. The second condition variable compared the flag prime condition (coded +1) to the USA prime condition and the control (both coded -.5), testing the hypothesis that the flag prime uniquely influenced responses. Both of these variables were interacted with news following, entered as a centered continuous variable ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 2.43$). We find no main effect of either condition variable, but, as predicted, that the first condition variable significantly interacted with news following, $\beta = .329$,

⁵ We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.

$t(98) = 1.95, p = .05$, but the second variable did not ($t < 1$). That is, participants high in news following who were primed with either American cue (the American flag or “USA”) were more likely to complete the word fragments with power-related words, as compared to the control. A simple slopes test confirms this is the case for high news followers (+1SD), $\beta = .426, t(98) = 1.84, p < .07$, but not low news followers (-1SD), $\beta = -.233, t(98) = -1.01, p > .31$ (see Figure 1b). As in the previous experiment, there were no significant interactions with political ideology/affiliation.

Experiments 2a and 2b demonstrated an implicit association between America and the abstract concept of power. After being subtly or subliminally primed with an American cue, participants showed a greater accessibility of the concept of power. Additionally, this relationship does not appear to be limited to the American flag, as another American cue produced an identical effect. These two experiments also showed that news exposure predicted the effects such that only those with at least some moderate exposure showed the effects. Political ideology, on the other hand, did not moderate the effects.

These two experiments thus demonstrate that America is implicitly linked with the concept of power, but is this link motivational? Does exposure to American cues make people want more power? We test this motivational aspect of our claim in the following experiments.

Experiment 3: Attitudes Toward Power

The present experiment tests whether American cues are priming a *desire* for power, rather than mere accessibility of the concept of power. Indeed, if a goal for power is in fact being activated by the primes, we would expect that concepts related to power should increase in desirability when the goal is active (e.g., Carbanac, 1971; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Ferguson, 2008; Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010; Förster, Liberman & Friedman,

2007; Lewin, 1951; Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson & Chassin, 2003). While by no means a definitive test, it would certainly be considered a necessary step toward dissociating a purely semantic prime from a goal prime (see Förster et al., 2007).

Specifically, we predicted that participants who are exposed to an American prime (versus not) will exhibit increased positive attitudes toward the concept of power, as represented by power-related words and images, provided that they at least moderately follow U.S. political news.

Methods

Participants and procedure. Eighty-six participants (36 male, 48 female, 2 unspecified) completed the survey packet either during breaks in other studies, or were approached on campus to complete the survey in exchange for a candy bar.

The priming manipulation was the same as in Experiment 2b (except that only two priming conditions were used), in which either an American flag or a grey box was present in the top corners of the demographics page of the questionnaire packet. The second and third pages consisted of measures of attitudes toward power words and power images, respectively.

Participants were asked to rate each word or image on a seven-point scale (1=very negative, 4=neutral, 7=very positive) based on their first or gut reaction. The same power-related words used in Experiment 2a and 2b were used in the power-word rating survey (*leader, boss, rule, captain, power, master*), plus 9 filler words to serve as a distraction to the purpose of the measure (e.g. *table, computer, spinach*). The power-related image survey was made up of 9 power-related images (e.g. police officers, executives, judges, large desks) and 9 neutral images as filler items (e.g. plates, bottled water, a bird). The fourth and final page contained the same suspicion probe used in Experiment 2b.

Results and Discussion

One participant expressed some suspicion of the flag prime, and was removed from the analysis, though including this participant's data does not alter the direction or significance of the results.

The ratings for the power-related images and words were averaged into a composite index of attitude toward the concept of power ($\alpha = .72$). There were no main effects of the prime on either power attitudes or attitudes toward the control words and images (all t 's < 1). There was, however, the predicted interaction between priming condition and news following for the power words and images, $\beta = .494$, $t(81) = 2.46$, $p < .02$, but not the control words and images, $t < 1$. A test of the simple slopes at 1 SD above and below the mean amount of news exposure ($M = 5.03$, $SD = 2.37$) confirmed that high news followers in the American prime condition reported more positive attitudes toward power, $\beta = .596$, $t(81) = 2.11$, $p < .04$, while the American prime did not have a significant impact on low news followers' power attitudes, $\beta = -.439$, $t(81) = -1.41$, $p = .16$ (see Figure 3). As in the previous experiments, political ideology played no moderating role.

These findings show that American cues implicitly increase the desirability of power, but only for those with some political news exposure. In the next experiment, we move toward examining how this greater desire for power might influence judgments about American politics.

Experiment 4: Effects on support for American policy

In this experiment, we tested whether a subtle American cue would lead people to desire more power and influence for the United States. This represents a fairly strong test of our claim that explicit beliefs about American power are dissociated from the implicit associations learned through exposure to U.S. political news. If we see that a subtle American cue influences endorsement of American dominance among both liberals and conservatives—provided that they

follow the news—then it seems safe to conclude that the effect is not explicit. To do this, we created a composite nationalism scale, selecting items from the Patriotism and Nationalism Scale (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) concerning America’s influence on other countries, as well as a few novel items. The concept of American nationalism, as defined by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), is not a mere love for one’s country, but rather the belief that “America is superior and should be dominant” (pg. 261). If such a belief is to be enacted, America would need to secure more power relative to other nations in order to exert its influence (Bernholz, 1985; Morgenthau, 1973). Thus, our measure is intended to tap both the belief that America should be dominant and the desire for greater means (i.e. power and authority) with which to dominate other nations (for related research, see Kimmelmeir & Winter, 2008).

Methods

Participants and procedure. One hundred thirteen participants at a large midwestern university (69 female, 43 male, 1 unspecified) completed the survey during a break in an unrelated experiment.

The survey packet consisted only of a survey of desire for national power, and the same media exposure/ ideology questionnaire and suspicion probe used in Experiments 2b and 3. The survey on national power was designed to assess feelings about America’s role in international affairs, particularly in regards to imposing its ideology on other countries. The survey used 9 items from the Nationalism, Internationalism, and World Government⁶ subscales of the Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) Patriotism and Nationalism questionnaire, plus 3 novel items that directly addressed whether America should dictate global economic policy, prevent other nations from obtaining nuclear weapons, and use military force to maintain stability in volatile regions.

⁶ The Internationalism and World Government items were scored such that higher numbers indicate greater agreement with American isolationism.

All questions were answered on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Because we wanted to assess participants' views about American power before any reminders of their political affiliation, this survey was presented first, with either American flags or grey boxes in the top corners of the page, as in Experiments 2b and 3.

Results and Discussion

None of the participants expressed any suspicion regarding the flag or control images at the top of the surveys, or awareness of the experiment hypotheses.

The items of the national power survey were reasonably well correlated ($\alpha = .81$), and were averaged into a single index of desire for national power. Participants in the flag condition ($M_{\text{flag}} = 3.98$, $SD_{\text{flag}} = .91$) indicated a greater desire for American power than participants in the control condition ($M_{\text{control}} = 3.53$, $SD_{\text{control}} = .83$), $t(111) = 2.79$, $p < .01$, $d = .51$.

This finding is consistent with the idea that the American flag is a strong symbol of American power and dominance, and even incidental exposure to it shifts the desire for national power. This effect was not qualified by explicit political ideology (or any of the other individual difference variables described above), which means that both liberals and conservatives showed the same magnitude of effect, despite strong explicit disagreement about how America should exercise its power (correlation between conservatism and desire for American power: $r = .44$, $p < .0001$). Importantly, the sample was politically quite diverse ($Mean = -.735$, $Median = 0$, $SD = 7.29$, based on the composite measure described above), so it is unlikely that we lacked the statistical power to detect a difference.

Additionally, the effect was not significantly moderated by news exposure. However, given the findings in the previous 3 experiments, as well as our predictions concerning its moderating role, we examined its influence in these results more closely. Although the

interaction of prime condition and news following was not significant, the influence of the American prime was strongest among high news followers, as predicted. A test of the simple slopes at 1 SD above and below the mean amount of news exposure ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 2.47$) shows that the effect was significant for high news followers $\beta = .55$, $t(108) = 2.34$, $p < .03$, but not for low news followers, $\beta = .34$, $t(108) = 1.46$, $p = .15$.

As the previous experiments showed with accessibility and desirability of power in the abstract, the mere presence of a small image of the flag in the corner of the questionnaire led participants to express significantly greater support for American dominance over other nations. These results join other recent work showing that decision-making and behavior in the political realm can be driven by nonconscious and unintentional (and perhaps unwanted) processing of relevant cues in the environment (e.g., Carter et al., 2011; Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005; Hassin et al., 2007).

In the next two experiments, we tested whether the link between America and the power goal would have implications for non-national domains. After incidental exposure to American cues, participants should express more of a desire for power even in terms of career aspirations and reactions to self-relevant feedback about personality.

Experiment 5: Desire for Personal Power

Here we tested whether American cues influence the desire for power in the form of a high status job. Status in the business world, particularly that conferred by salary, title and managing subordinates is, while not the same as power per se (e.g. Magee & Galinsky, 2008), is nonetheless indicative of the power to execute one's agenda without being beholden to others, part and parcel of our definition of power. We used a different priming procedure in this experiment, one designed to simulate a real-world yet subtle, unobtrusive exposure to the

American flag. Participants then rated the importance of high- and neutral-status job attributes. We predicted that after exposure to the American flag, participants who reported some moderate exposure to political news would rate high-status, but not neutral-status, attributes as being more important to their consideration for a new job.

Methods

Participants and procedure. One hundred eleven participants (42 male, 69 female) were approached on campus and asked to complete a survey packet for the psychology department in exchange for a candy bar. The survey packet consisted only of the same media exposure/ideology questionnaire used in the above experiments, the priming manipulation (a “visual geography quiz”, see below), a job attributes rating survey, and a suspicion probe.⁷

The priming manipulation was described as a “visual geography quiz,” and asked participants to identify which one of two locations was depicted in each of four photographs, and to indicate their confidence in that identification. For half of participants, two of the four pictures included an image of the American flag (flag condition). For the other half of the participants, those same pictures had the flags digitally removed (control condition; see Carter et al., 2011 supplemental materials, for examples of the images).

For the measure of the desirability of status, we asked participants to imagine that they were looking for a new job, and to rate 8 different job attributes for how important each would be to their decision. Four of the 8 attributes were high-status attributes (salary, possibilities for a raise in salary, prestige of job title, having subordinates to supervise), whereas the other four attributes were relatively unrelated to status (intellectually stimulating, flexible hours, friendly atmosphere/co-workers, opportunity to work with people), and served as a check on divergent

⁷ There was an exploratory questionnaire concerning political issues administered after this main dependent measure, but was unrelated to the present experiment and therefore will not be discussed further.

validity. The attributes were pretested for the degree to which they connoted status on a 1-7 scale. The high-status attributes ($M = 6.04$, $SD = .50$) were indeed rated as higher in status than the neutral-status attributes ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.08$), paired $t(13) = 7.03$, $p < .001$, as well as each individually significantly above the scale midpoint (all $t_s > 3.5$).

The final page contained three questions designed to assess awareness of the presence of the American prime and any suspicion of the visual geography quiz.

Results

No participants expressed any suspicion or awareness of the American flags in the visual geography quiz.

We averaged the importance ratings of the high and neutral-status attributes into two separate composite measures. There was no main effect of prime condition, but there was the predicted interaction between priming condition and news following on the high-status attributes, $\beta = .357$, $t(107) = 2.14$, $p < .04$ (see Figure 4). This interaction was not significant for the neutral-status attributes, $t < 1$. Moreover, the Prime X News exposure interaction was marginally significant when looking at a difference score between the high- and neutral-status attributes, $\beta = .436$, $t(107) = 1.83$, $p = .07$, suggesting that the importance ascribed to high-status attributes came at the expense of the neutral-status attributes.

A test of the simple slopes at 1 SD above and below the mean amount of news exposure ($M = 4.46$, $SD = 2.51$) confirms that the American prime influenced the ratings of high news followers, $\beta = .448$, $t(107) = 1.91$, $p < .06$, but not low news followers, $\beta = -.266$, $t(107) = -1.13$, $p = .26$.

As in previous experiments, this effect was not qualified by participants' reported political ideology, despite a correlation between conservative political ideology and ratings of the importance of high-status attributes ($r = .25, p = .008$).

Discussion

The findings reveal that American cues increase people's desire for power when thinking about their ideal job. Participants indicated that the status provided by a high-paying and prestigious job was more important after being subtly primed with an American cue. Again, consistent with the last several experiments, this effect was moderated by exposure to political news media, with the effect emerging only for those with at least some moderate amount of news exposure. In the next experiment, we sought stronger evidence that this link between American and power is a motivational one. We also tested for effects in a different non-national domain.

Experiment 6: Motivated Bias

In order to demonstrate the motivational underpinnings of the implicit association between America and power, we borrowed a paradigm from the motivational bias literature. Specifically, we modeled the following study on one by Pronin, Lin and Ross (2002, Study 3), which demonstrated motivated self-enhancement. Participants in their study rated a social intelligence test as a more valid measure when it produced positive rather than negative results. In the present experiment, we had participants complete an analogous procedure, but rather than a test about social intelligence, participants were given a test ostensibly designed to categorize them on a new power-related personality dimension, as either a "Leader" or a "Follower." They were given feedback indicating they were either firmly on the Leader (high-power feedback) or Follower (low-power feedback) end of the spectrum, and then asked to evaluate the test.

We would generally expect participants to be more pleased with the “Leader” feedback, and to evaluate the test much more positively than those given feedback indicating they are a “Follower.” More importantly, if exposure to the flag is indeed priming a desire or goal for power, then participants so primed should be especially sensitive to feedback about their progress toward that goal, and will show an exaggerated tendency to be defensive in the face of negative (low-power) feedback, and especially pleased when given positive (high-power) feedback. More specifically, if participants primed with a flag have a greater desire for power, they will rate the test even less valid upon getting “Follower” feedback, and even more valid when given “Leader” feedback. Thus, we are predicting an interaction between priming condition and the type of feedback in predicting participants’ ratings of the test. As in the previous studies, we expect that this effect will be strongest for participants with some moderate exposure to political news. This pattern of results should provide strong evidence that a desire for power, rather than mere accessibility, is being primed.

Methods

Participants. One hundred ninety-two participants (149 female, 42 male, 1 unspecified) were recruited for a study on personality, in exchange for either \$5 or course credit.

Procedure and materials. For participants in the flag-prime condition, the computer used for the test was affixed with a small (1.27cm x 1.91cm) American flag sticker on the top center of the monitor. This sticker was absent for participants in the control condition.

Participants were told that the experiment was designed to evaluate a new personality test, the Leadership Aptitude Test, “aimed at measuring a particular set of leadership intuitions by combining elements of existing intelligence and aptitude tests, with the aim of categorizing people as either Leaders or Followers.” The description of the personality dimension was

designed to evoke the dimension of power; Leaders were described as well suited to high-power positions, with Followers being better suited for low-power positions:

Leaders tend to be highly adaptive and intelligent, good at managing people, and are generally highly successful in leadership or management positions in a wide variety of fields – everything from business executives to non-profit managers to academic researchers. Followers tend to be more rigid and focused, very good at following instructions, and tend to be much more successful in subordinate than management or leadership positions.

The test itself was 45 items, a combination of multiple-choice questions about managerial style and beliefs as a face-valid measure of leadership skills, and somewhat difficult Raven's Progressive Matrices to reflect the "aptitude" portion of the test's description. Participants were instructed to answer as many of the questions as they could within 7 minutes, and told that not everyone finishes the test. Having participants work under time pressure was meant to create some anxiety about the test, as well as to make their performance more difficult to gauge, and thus the false feedback more believable. After 7 minutes, the experimenter asked the participant to stop, and then moved to the end of the test so their score could be "calculated."

On the score page, participants in the Leader condition were told they scored a 40 out of a possible 50 points, which put them in the Moderate Leader category (31-40), just on the cusp of being a Strong Leader (41-50). Participants in the Follower condition were told they scored an 11 out of 50 points, which put them in the Moderate Follower category (11-20), just on the cusp of

being a Strong Follower (1-10). Thus, participants were given feedback indicating either that they had an aptitude for high-power roles, or low-power roles.

Next, participants were asked for their feedback about the test, ostensibly to get “opinions from actual test takers.” Participants answered three questions about the test, including how accurate it was in measuring their abilities (1 = not at all accurate, 7 = highly accurate), whether they thought it was a valid measure of whether a person is a Leader or Follower (1 = not at all valid, 7 = very valid), and whether they thought that scores on the test would correlate with other leadership tests (1 = scores would not be at all correlated, 7 = scores would be highly correlated). Participants were also given the opportunity to freely respond with any comments they had about the test.

After completing some unrelated questions, and a variety of potential moderator questions, including political news following (1 = rarely, 7 = very often), party affiliation (1 = Republican, 7 = Democrat), and political ideology (1 = Conservative, 7 = Liberal), participants answered a funneled suspicion probe. One participant expressed suspicion that the experiment was really about whether the feedback influenced perceptions of the test’s validity. The results remain the same whether or not this participant was included. No participants mentioned the presence of the flag sticker.

Results and Discussion

We first conducted a 2 (Feedback: Leader vs. Follower) x 2 (Prime: Flag vs. Control) ANOVA using a composite measure of the three questions assessing the test’s validity ($\alpha = .88$). As predicted, there was a main effect of feedback, such that participants in the Follower condition ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 1.24$) rated the test’s validity significantly lower than participants in the Leader condition ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 1.08$), $F(1,188) = 45.15$, $p < .001$. Importantly, this was

qualified by the predicted Feedback x Prime interaction, $F(1,188) = 4.32, p < .05$. As depicted in Figure 5, compared to participants in the control condition, participants primed with the American flag reacted more positively to high-power feedback, and more negatively to low-power feedback.

Although we expected to find that the above pattern was moderated by news following, that three-way interaction did not reach significance, $t(184) = 1.19, p = .24$. However, looking separately at high and low news followers, it is clear that the Feedback x Prime interaction is driven by those high in news following. Indeed, looking just at those high in news following (+1 SD), the Feedback x Prime interaction remains significant, $\beta = .845, t(184) = 2.29, p < .03$. Those low on news following (-1 SD), however, show only the main effect of feedback, but no interaction with prime condition, $\beta = .219, t(184) < 1$. While not as strong as expected, this nonetheless suggests that news exposure is an important part of the effect. As in the previous experiments, there were no significant interactions with political ideology.

This study provides some stronger evidence of the motivational underpinnings of the association between America and power. When given feedback that their aptitude for high-power positions was low (high), participants primed with the flag responded more defensively (leniently), compared with participants in the control condition. This pattern of defensiveness in the face of negative feedback and uncritical acceptance of positive feedback is typically seen as evidence of a motivated bias (see Kunda, 1990).

General Discussion

Across seven experiments, the findings show that participants with at least some moderate amount of news exposure possessed an implicit association between America and a desire for power. The abstract concept of power was both more accessible (Experiments 2a-b)

and more desirable (Experiment 3) after exposure to the American flag as well as more general American cues ('USA' in Experiment 2b).

American cues led participants to exhibit a greater desire for America itself to have more power and influence (Experiment 4), and also primed a goal for power in contexts completely unrelated to the nation, including the importance of power-related job attributes (Experiment 5), and increased motivated bias when evaluating the validity of a power-related personality test (Experiment 6).

We tested whether this effect was moderated by an assortment of variables. Across the experiments, the pattern of results was highly consistent and showed that participants' degree of exposure to American political news was the only significant moderator, in line with both our predictions and previous research (Carter et al. 2011b; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007). Only those participants with at least a moderate amount of exposure to American political news showed evidence of an association between America and a desire for power.

The priming procedures used across the experiments were diverse, all with identical effects, and though most of the primes were supraliminal, very few participants thought them out of place. We also contend that awareness of the primes does not translate into being able to predict or control the prime's influence, as was the case with the participants who saw the subliminal prime in Experiment 2A but responded no differently than those who did not. To test this contention more directly, we presented two measures used in the experiments described above to a group of 32 participants, and asked them whether they thought that the presence of an American cue would impact their responses to such a measure, and if so, whether it would be troubling. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine that they were filling out a questionnaire about either America's role in foreign affairs (from Experiment 4) or about the

importance of job attributes related to status (from Experiment 5) with an American flag hanging in the corner of the room. We first asked them whether or not they thought the presence of the flag would influence their responses, the possible direction of influence, and whether they would be troubled by such an influence (each on 1-13 Likert scales). There were no differences depending on which measure participants imagined filling out (all t 's < 1), and in both cases, they reported that they were not likely to be impacted ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 3.36$), one-sample t-test against scale midpoint $t(31) = -3.89$, $p < .001$, that the direction of influence (if any) was inconsistent, $t < 1$, and that they would be fairly bothered by any influence ($M = 6.56$, $SD = 3.73$), with roughly 60% of participants giving a response at or above the scale midpoint.

This short survey demonstrates that people generally assume that they will not be affected by American cues, and suggests that the effect demonstrated in the studies above operates outside of people's awareness and without their consent. Based on other work on mental contamination and controlling an automatic bias (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler & Wänke, 1993; Wilson & Brekke, 1994), it seems unlikely that an attempt to correct for it, even if one were to adjust in the right direction (which itself appears unlikely), would be of an appropriate magnitude. Efforts to avoid being biased by American cues would likely still result in deviations from what would be considered one's preferred response.

Below we address various theoretical issues relevant to the present findings.

Implications of a Greater Desire for Power

In addition to influencing beliefs about national power directly in Experiment 4, the implicit America-power link led to effects on judgments and behaviors completely unrelated to the nation (Experiments 2a-b, 3, 5-6). As other work on the implicit effects of power suggests,

manipulating the importance of and desire for power can have consequences in non-political, everyday behaviors, exerting a potentially undesirable influence that people would not necessarily expect or be able to counteract. Given that this is the first evidence of the association between America and the power goal, the present experiments have been primarily focused on establishing the effect, moderators, boundaries and some of the consequences. However, the downstream consequences of subtle American cues should be evident across a diverse range of situations and behaviors, only a small fraction of which were examined in the present research.

How might the implicit effect of American cues on a greater desire for power impact everyday behaviors? Even small shifts in preferences can lead to relatively larger downstream consequences, as evidenced by rightward shifts in voting behavior that resulted from an American flag prime (Carter et al., 2011). In normal interpersonal interactions, an increased desire for power might increase defensiveness in response to threats to one's sense of dominance (as in Experiment 6), potentially escalating conflicts, and even leading to broader negative health outcomes (McClelland, 1982; Wirth, Welsh & Schultheiss, 2006). In the political landscape, in addition to the direct implications for shifts in foreign and military policy preferences demonstrated in Experiment 4, a greater desire for power might lead one toward policies and candidates that bolster one's own status, either by increasing the dominance of one's ingroup, or perhaps through fiscal and social policies that increase one's wealth at the expense of general social welfare (see Carter et al., 2011b).

The Motivational Nature of the Link Between America and Power

In the experiments reported above, we found that participants, at least those with some news exposure, expressed a greater desire for power after an American cue. Does this imply that they are thus *motivated* to obtain power? There is reason to believe so, based on the similarity of

our findings to those in the goal literature. For example, a classic effect of a goal is that it makes relevant stimuli more positive (Carbanac, 1971; Ferguson, 2008; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008; Lewin, 1951; Pervin, 1989; Seibt et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2003). In Experiment 3, power-related words and images were rated as significantly more positive after an American prime. Similarly, in Experiment 5, goal-relevant concepts (high-status job attributes), but not goal-irrelevant concepts (neutral-status job attributes) were rated as being more important after an American prime. Most convincingly, participants in Experiment 6 who were primed with flags responded with greater defensiveness in the face of feedback indicating their personality was better suited to low-power positions, and uncritical acceptance of feedback indicating they were better suited to high-power positions. These kinds of defensive biases are generally thought to be motivational (rather than cognitive) in nature (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Sherman & Cohen, 2002), suggesting that indeed participants exhibited an increased desire for power, and not merely increased activation of the power concept. They were more defensive when their desire for power was challenged, and more complacent when it was affirmed.

Although the present investigation concentrated primarily on establishing the effect itself, future research could further examine the effects of American cues for a range of motivational behaviors. For example, would participants primed with an American cue who were then denied an opportunity to obtain some power (i.e., a goal frustration), go to even greater lengths to obtain it? Or, if given some opportunity to obtain some measure of power or status (i.e., goal satiation), would participants then show a marked decrease in the effects reported above? Although beyond the purview of the present article, we believe that there are promising ways to examine the boundaries and extent of the implicit effect of American cues on a desire for power.

The Moderating Role of News Exposure

Across the experiments, the degree of participants' exposure to U.S. political news predicted the strength of their implicit association between America and a desire for power. Those with at least moderate news exposure showed the predicted pattern, whereas those low in news exposure did not. Participants who follow political news may be either learning or strengthening the association between America and a desire for power from the wealth of complex information in the news media. Exposure to information in the news media does impact people's explicit opinions and beliefs (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Berkowitz, 1984; Bushman & Cantor, 2003; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; McCombs & Shaw, 1991; Strange & Leung, 1999), and may influence the implicit associations developed in memory as well. As discussed in the introduction, even though political pundits and leaders may only rarely assert that "America wants power", many of the themes and issues discussed in the news media are related to the dynamics of power, even though they are clothed in the specific context of the issue at hand. And, people may be able to extract this underlying relationship over time. For example, as media personnel discuss the ongoing military conflict in Afghanistan, nuclear tensions with Iran and North Korea, and whether American economic dominance is threatened by the current financial crisis, news followers may (perhaps implicitly) extract the basic theme of a desire for American dominance, despite the contextual details. Those who are regularly exposed to such information, namely the high news exposure participants in our experiments, may be most likely to develop those associations in memory.

This does not necessarily mean that those low in news exposure do not have such associations; it may be the case that for them, either the link between America and the power goal is not automatized, or other information is more strongly associated with America in

memory, inhibiting or competing with information related to the desire for power when primed with an American cue.⁸

Pointing to the dissociation between implicit versus explicit associations between America and power, the implicit effects emerged irrespective of participants' explicit ideological beliefs about how America should use its power. Thus, despite an explicit disagreement about American power, activating the implicit knowledge of America influenced liberals and conservatives in the same way – both groups consistently indicated that America should have more power and influence in world affairs after an American prime in Experiment 4. News exposure, despite not being positively related to an explicit endorsement of American power (Experiment 1), was predictive of a motivational nation-power link across the experiments.

Of course, because news exposure is a self-reported (and self-selected) individual difference variable, we cannot be certain that the causal arrow does not point in the other direction. It could be that those who are highly concerned about the role of America in world affairs or who already possess a strong link between America and a desire for power tend to more closely follow the news. Although we cannot rule out this possibility with the present experiments, there are patterns within our data that suggest otherwise. For instance, if people who had a great deal of concern about American power were choosing to watch the news, one would assume that their beliefs about the use of that power (and thus the direction of the association) would not be uniform. For instance, one might expect a liberal who followed the

⁸ Although the graphs of some studies suggest that participants low on news exposure show effects in the opposite direction of participants high on news exposure, in all cases, this effect was not significant. This is further confirmed by a meta-analysis of the *t*-values of the simple slopes tests for participants low in news following. Using the procedures outlined in Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2001, pg. 72), we calculated the unweighted ($r = -.041$; 95% CI: -0.13, 0.05) and weighted ($r = -.026$; 95% CI: -0.12, 0.06) means of the Fisher-*Z* transformed *r*s. Because neither of these means are significantly different from zero, we can safely conclude that participants low in news exposure are not showing evidence of a desire for less power after exposure to an American cue.

news to have very different explicit beliefs about the use of American power than a conservative who followed the news. Based on this, we might reasonably expect that liberals and conservatives who watch a fair amount of news would show opposite effects when primed with an American cue, yet we found no evidence of a three-way interaction between news following and political ideology, nor any consistent bivariate correlation between news following and political ideology, in any of the studies reported here or elsewhere (Carter, Ferguson & Hassin, 2011a, 2011b; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007).

It is also possible that some unmeasured variable explains both the America-power association and the variable of news following. However, in a pilot study assessing news following and a number of other variables such as religiosity, political ideology, socialism/capitalism, social desirability, materialism, individualism/collectivism, and patriotism/nationalism ($n = 1007$), our news-following measure was only strongly correlated with other variables related to exposure to the media, such as specific media sources. It was modestly correlated with need for cognition ($r = .27$), but it should be noted that need for cognition has not served a similar moderating role in other studies (e.g. Carter, Ferguson & Hassin, 2011a). Also, importantly, news exposure was completely uncorrelated with political ideology in this large-scale study ($r = .02, p > .5$).

If, in fact, exposure to political news creates an automatic link between America and a desire for power, it is likely that this happens over a fairly long period of time (i.e., not after a single exposure). People may need repeated exposures to extract this particular bivariate relationship from such a diverse and complicated array of information. Indeed, other research suggests that people need repeated exposures to develop an automatic link between two concepts such that the perception of one automatically activates in memory the other (e.g., Hebb, 1949;

Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As such, an experimental manipulation of news exposure to establish the causal direction of an automatic link would likely require a longitudinal study.

It is worth noting that the mean level of news exposure in each study was consistently below the scale's midpoint (i.e., 5.5 on a 1-10 scale), and the average of those participants who were above the median on this variable tended to be around 6.1. This suggests that these effects held for participants with at least some moderate amount of exposure to the news, rather than only extreme "news junkies" for instance. Furthermore, liberal and conservative participants alike showed the predicted effects, even on measures that were strongly associated with political beliefs (e.g. Experiments 4 and 5), suggesting that it is not a function of specific biased news sources.

Implicit Nationalism

Nationalism, as traditionally construed, is any explicit act in support of one's nation, particularly those that mark the nation as superior to others (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Given the important role that the concept of, and desire for, power plays in a nation's continued sovereignty (Hobbes, 1651/1962; Machiavelli, 1532/1997; Morgenthau, 1973; Weber, 1919/1958), any behavior or opinion that strengthens American power or otherwise supports the current social structure, even if it is expressed due to a nonconscious influence, might thus be considered an (implicit) expression of nationalism, not unlike non-conscious system-justification (Carter et al., 2011b; Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza & Napier, 2008). Indeed, participants in our studies were unaware of the influence of the American cues on their responses, both in relation to national policies (in Experiment 4) and in completely unrelated domains (Experiments 5-6). This raises the intriguing possibility that nationalistic beliefs and actions can operate

outside of conscious awareness, and are not limited to the more explicit declarations of nationalism, like reciting the pledge of allegiance or waving a flag at a political rally. The present findings may provide some empirical support to the long-speculated idea that ideology, such as nationalism, operates largely nonconsciously (Billig, 1995).

Another direction for future research would be to test whether the link between America and a desire for power is bidirectional. That is, would activating the concept of, or desire for, power lead to concepts related to the nation becoming more accessible? Would people placed in positions of power suddenly favor nationalistic policies more than before? Would it be true only of those high in news exposure? Perhaps more importantly, is the implicit association between America and the power goal unique to America (or American participants), or is it true of other nations? To the extent that the existence of all nations is contingent on maintaining some form of power and sovereignty (Morgenthau, 1973), it seems plausible that citizens of most countries would have some implicit desire for their home nation to continue to exist, and even exert more influence on the course of the world. However, in the studies presented above, we found that the relationship between America and a desire for power was moderated by exposure to political news, which is rife with discussions of America's role in global issues that have American power as an underlying construct. This suggests that the people in other countries would need exposure to similar types of information-dissemination in order to develop such an association with their own country. Such information-dissemination may be less prominent in countries that play a less active role in world affairs, or whose own affairs are overshadowed by the affairs of more dominant or immediately relevant global players. However, in a study conducted in the Netherlands (Carter, van de Ven, & Ferguson, 2012), Dutch participants primed with their national flag showed an increased desire for both personal power (autonomy) and social power

(authority over others). This suggests that perhaps the implicit link is indeed more than an American phenomenon.

Conclusions

American participants with at least some moderate amount of exposure to political news implicitly associate America with a desire for power, linking a historically important theory about the centrality of power to nations to specific psychological effects. After a subtle presentation of an American cue, participants demonstrated an increased accessibility and desire for power across a diverse range of measures and paradigms, both those related as well as completely unrelated to national affairs and decisions. Moreover, as the survey presented above suggests, participants neither expected such an effect nor were pleased with the possibility of being influenced. The association between America and the power goal emerged to the same degree in people who explicitly disagree about America and power – namely, liberals and conservatives, which strongly suggests that this implicit effect is dissociated from people's explicit beliefs. What are typically considered innocuous, background features of the political landscape (i.e. American cues) can indeed change and alter people's motivations and goals, without awareness or intention.

References

- Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Anderson, C. A. (1983). The causal structure of situations: The generation of plausible causal attributions as a function of type of event situation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19*(2), 185-203. doi:10.1016/0022-1031%2883%2990037-9
- Anderson, C. A., & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experience of power: Examining the effects of power on approach and inhibition tendencies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*(6), 1362-1377. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1362
- Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Media violence and the American public revisited. *American Psychologist, 57*(6-7), 448-450. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.57.6-7.448
- Anderson, C. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 36*(4), 511-536. doi:10.1002/ejsp.324
- Anderson, J. R. (1996). ACT: A simple theory of complex cognition. *American Psychologist, 51*(4), 355-365. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.51.4.355
- Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against the controllability of automatic stereotype effects. In Y. Trope, & S. Chaiken (Eds.), *Dual-process theories in social psychology* (pp. 361-382). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
- Bargh, J. A. (Ed.). (2007). *Social psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher mental processes*. New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.
- Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2000). The mind in the middle: A practical guide to priming and automaticity research. In C. M. Judd, & H. T. Reis (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology* (pp. 253-285). New York, NY, US:

Cambridge University Press.

Bargh, J. A., Raymond, P., Pryor, J. B., & Strack, F. (1995). Attractiveness of the underling: An automatic power-->sex association and its consequences for sexual harassment and aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *68*(5), 768-781.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.5.768

Berkowitz, L. (1984). Some effects of thoughts on anti- and prosocial influences of media events: A cognitive-neoassociation analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *95*(3), 410-427.

doi:10.1037/0033-2909.95.3.410

Bernholz, P. (1985). *The international game of power: Past, present, and future*. Berlin, New York: Mouton.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. London ;Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Bushman, B. J., & Cantor, J. (2003). Media ratings for violence and sex: Implications for policymakers and parents. *American Psychologist*, *58*(2), 130-141. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.2.130

Butz, D. A., Plant, E. A., & Doerr, C. E. (2007). Liberty and justice for all? implications of exposure to the U.S. flag for intergroup relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*(3), 396-408. doi:10.1177/0146167206296299

Cabanac, M. (1971). Physiological role of pleasure. *Science*, *173*(4002), 1103-&

doi:10.1126/science.173.4002.1103

Carlston, D. E., & Smith, E. R. (1996). Principles of mental representation. In A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 184-210).

New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.

Carter, T. J., Ferguson, M. J., & Hassin, R. R. (2011a). A single exposure to the American flag

- shifts support toward republicanism up to 8 months later. *Psychological Science*, 22(8), 1011-1018. doi:10.1177/0956797611414726
- Carter, T. J., Ferguson, M. J., & Hassin, R. R. (2011b). Implicit nationalism as system justification: The case of the United States of America. *Social Cognition*, 29(3), 341-359. doi:10.1521/soco.2011.29.3.341
- Carter, T. J., van de Ven, N., & Ferguson, M. J. (2012). *American and Dutch flag primes different versions of power*. Manuscript in preparation.
- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(1), 5-18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5
- Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). American = white? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88(3), 447-466. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.447
- Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and interracial interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(1), 62-68. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.1.62
- Fast, N. J., Gruenfeld, D. H., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Illusory control: A generative force behind power's far-reaching effects. *Psychological Science*, 20(4), 502-508. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02311.x
- Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69(6), 1013-1027. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1013
- Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50(2), 229-238.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.50.2.229

Ferguson, M. J. (2008). On becoming ready to pursue a goal you don't know you have: Effects of nonconscious goals on evaluative readiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*(6), 1268-1294. doi:10.1037/a0013263

Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit on automatic evaluation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*(5), 557-572. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.557

Ferguson, M. J., Carter, T. J., & Hassin, R. R. (2009). On the automaticity of nationalist ideology: The case of the USA. In *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification*. (pp. 53-82) New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.

Ferguson, M. J., & Hassin, R. R. (2007). On the automatic association between America and aggression for news watchers. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33*(12), 1632-1647. doi:10.1177/0146167207307493

Feshbach, S. (1987). Individual aggression, national attachment, and the search for peace: Psychological perspectives. *Aggressive Behavior, 13*(5), 315-325. doi:10.1002/1098-2337(1987)13:5<315::AID-AB2480130508>3.0.CO;2-4

Feshbach, S. (1990). Psychology, human violence, and the search for peace: Issues in science and social values. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*(1), 183-198.

Fishbach, A., & Shah, J. Y. (2006). Self-control in action: Implicit dispositions toward goals and away from temptations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*(5), 820-832. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.820

Fishbach, A., Zhang, Y., & Trope, Y. (2010). Counteractive evaluation: Asymmetric shifts in the implicit value of conflicting motivations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,*

46(1), 29-38. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.09.008

Fiske, S. T., & Berdahl, J. (2007). Social power. In *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed.)*. (pp. 678-692) New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.

Fitzsimons, G. M., & Shah, J. Y. (2008). How goal instrumentality shapes relationship evaluations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*(2), 319-337.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.2.319

Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Friedman, R. S. (2007). Seven principles of goal activation: A systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal constructs. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11*(3), 211-233.
doi:10.1177/1088868307303029

Galdi, S., Arcuri, L., & Gawronski, B. (2008). Automatic mental associations predict future choices of undecided decision-makers. *Science, 321*(5892), 1100-1102.
doi:10.1126/science.1160769

Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85*(3), 453-466. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.3.453

Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken. *Psychological Science, 17*(12), 1068-1074. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01824.x

Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000). Power can bias impression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 3*(3), 227-256. doi:10.1177/1368430200003003001

Guinote, A. (2007a). Power affects basic cognition: Increased attentional inhibition and flexibility. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43*(5), 685-697.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.06.008

Guinote, A. (2007b). Power and goal pursuit. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(8), 1076-1087. doi:10.1177/0146167207301011

Hassin, R. R., Ferguson, M. J., Kardosh, R., Porter, S. C., Carter, T. J., & Dudareva, V. (2009). Précis of implicit nationalism. In *Values, empathy, and fairness across social barriers*. (pp. 135-145) New York, NY, US: New York Academy of Sciences.

Hassin, R. R., Ferguson, M. J., Shidlovski, D., & Gross, L. (2007). Subliminal exposure to national flags affects political thought and behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 104(50), 19757-19761. doi:10.1073/pnas.0704679104

Hebb, D. O. (1949). *The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory*. New York, NY: John Wiley.

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2002). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hobbes, T. (1962). *Leviathan; or, the matter, forme & power of a commonwealth, ecclesiasticall and civil*. New York: Collier Books. (Original work published 1651)

Howard, D. V., & Howard, J. H. (1992). Adult age differences in the rate of learning serial patterns: Evidence from direct and indirect tests. *Psychology and Aging*, 7(2), 232-241. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.7.2.232

Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. Chicago, IL, US: University of Chicago Press.

Jost, J. T., Pietrzak, J., Liviatan, I., Mandisodza, A. N., & Napier, J. L. (2008). System justification as conscious and nonconscious goal pursuit. In J. Y. Shah, & W. L. Gardner

- (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation science*. (pp. 591-605). New York, NY US: Guilford Press.
- Kane, P. V. (November, 2011). To save our economy, ditch Taiwan. Retrieved April 12, 2012 from *The New York Times* website, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html>
- Keller, B. (March, 2012). Falling in and out of war. Retrieved April 12, 2012 from *The New York Times* website, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/opinion/keller-falling-in-and-out-of-war.html>
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review*, *110*(2), 265-284. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265
- Kemmelmeier, M., & Winter, D. G. (2008). Sowing patriotism, but reaping nationalism? Consequences of exposure to the American flag. *Political Psychology*, *29*(6), 859-879.
- Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology*, *10*(2), 257-274. doi:10.2307/3791647
- Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, *108*(3), 480-498. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
- Lewicki, P. (1986). Processing information about covariations that cannot be articulated. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *12*(1), 135-146.
- Lewicki, P., Hill, T., & Czyzewska, M. (1992). Nonconscious acquisition of information. *American Psychologist*, *47*(6), 796-801.
- Lewicki, P., Hill, T., & Czyzewska, M. (1997). Hidden covariation detection: A fundamental and ubiquitous phenomenon. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *23*(1), 221-228.

- Lewin, K. (1951). Intention, will and need. In *Organization and pathology of thought: Selected sources*. (pp. 95-153) New York, NY, US: Columbia University Press.
doi:10.1037/10584-005
- Machiavelli, N. (1997). *The prince* (A. Codevilla Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1532)
- Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 2(1), 351-398.
doi:10.1080/19416520802211628
- Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., Butz, D. A., & Peruche, B. M. (2007). Power, risk, and the status quo: Does power promote riskier or more conservative decision making? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(4), 451-462. doi:10.1177/0146167206297405
- McClelland, D. C. (1982). The need for power, sympathetic activation, and illness. *Motivation and Emotion*, 6(1), 31-41. doi:10.1007/BF00992135
- McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. (1991). The agenda-setting function of mass media. In M. E. McCombs, & D. L. Protes (Eds.), *Communication textbook series* (pp. 17-26). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* (5th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (Eds.). (1950). *Principles & problems of international politics: Selected readings*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mussweiler, T., & Neumann, R. (2000). Sources of mental contamination: Comparing the effects of self-generated versus externally provided primes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 36(2), 194-206. doi:10.1006/jesp.1999.1415

- Neely, J. H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *106*(3), 226-254. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.106.3.226
- Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of powerholders' social attention. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *99*(2), 227-243. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.003
- Pervin, L. A. (1989). Goal concepts: Themes, issues, and questions. In *Goal concepts in personality and social psychology*. (pp. 473-479) Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Porter, S., Ferguson, M. J., Carter, T. J., & Hassin, R. (2012). *Unintended American bias: American cues implicitly increase prejudice*. Manuscript in preparation.
- Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), *Information processing and cognition: The Loyola symposium* (pp. 55-85). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Reber, A. S. (1989). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *118*(3), 219-235. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.118.3.219
- Rosenthal, R., & DiMatteo, M. R. (2001). Meta analysis: Recent developments in quantitative methods for literature reviews. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *52*, 59-82. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.59
- Seibt, B., Hafner, M., & Deutsch, R. (2007). Prepared to eat: How immediate affective and motivational responses to food cues are influenced by food deprivation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37*(2), 359-379. doi:10.1002/ejsp.365
- Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and

- the reduction of defensive biases. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *11*(4), 119-123. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00182
- Sherman, S. J., Rose, J. S., Koch, K., Presson, C. C., & Chassin, L. (2003). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward cigarette smoking: The effects of context and motivation. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *22*(1), 13-39. doi:10.1521/jscp.22.1.13.22766
- Skitka, L. J. (2005). Patriotism or nationalism? Understanding post-September 11, 2001, flag-display behavior. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *35*(10), 1995-2011. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02206.x
- Slooman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, *119*(1), 3-22. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3
- Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (1999). Associative and rule-based processing: A connectionist interpretation of dual-process models. In S. Chaiken, & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual-process theories in social psychology*. (pp. 323-336) New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
- Smith, E. R., & Queller, S. (2001). Memory representations. In A. Tesser, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook in social psychology, vol. I: Intraindividual processes* (pp. 111-133). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Smith, P. K., & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Nonconscious effects of power on basic approach and avoidance tendencies. *Social Cognition*, *26*(1), 1-24. doi:10.1521/soco.2008.26.1.1
- Smith, P. K., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). The nonconscious nature of power: Cues and consequences. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *4*(10), 918-938. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00300.x
- Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you're in charge of the trees: Power priming and abstract information processing. *Journal of Personality and Social*

Psychology, 90(4), 578-596. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.578

Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3), 220-247.

doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1

Strack, F., Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Kübler, A., & Wänke, M. (1993). Awareness of the influence as a determinant of assimilation versus contrast. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 23(1), 53-62.

Strange, J. J., & Leung, C. C. (1999). How anecdotal accounts in news and fiction can influence judgments of a social problem's urgency, causes, and cures. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25(4), 436-449.

Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A. N., Goren, A., & Hall, C. C. (2005). Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes. *Science*, 308(5728), 1623-1626.

doi:10.1126/science.1110589

Weber, M. (1958). *Politics as a vocation* (H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press. (Original work published 1919)

Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: The role of naive theories in corrections for perceived bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(1), 36-51. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.1.36

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.1.36

Weisbuch, M., Pauker, K., & Ambady, N. (2009). The subtle transmission of race bias via televised nonverbal behavior. *Science*, 326(5960), 1711-1714.

doi:10.1126/science.1178358

Wilson, T. D., & Brekke, N. (1994). Mental contamination and mental correction: Unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. *Psychological Bulletin*, 116(1), 117-142.

doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.117

Winter, D. G. (1973). *The power motive*. New York, NY, US: Free Press.

Wirth, M. M., Welsh, K. M., & Schultheiss, O. C. (2006). Salivary cortisol changes in humans after winning or losing a dominance contest depend on implicit power motivation.

Hormones and Behavior, 49(3), 346-352.

Author's Note

This research was supported by Binational Science Foundation grant 2003133 to the second and third authors. We thank Emily Balcetis, Suzanne Baumgarten, Fermin Carrizales, Christina Hung, Leslie Jaw, Arkadiy Maksimovskiy, Samantha Stein, Alexandra Strauss, Sarah Thompson, Rachel Weinstock, and Veronica Williams for their help collecting data.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Travis J. Carter, University of Chicago, Center for Decision Research, Booth School of Business, 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637. E-mail: Travis.Carter@ChicagoBooth.edu or mjf44@cornell.edu.

Figure 1a:




Figure 1a. Percentage of word-fragments completed with the power-related word (as z-score) for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) on news exposure (Experiment 2a).

Figure 1b




Figure 1b. Percentage of word-fragments completed with the power-related word (as z-score) for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) on news exposure, according to regression comparing flag and USA conditions to the control (Experiment 2b).

Figure 2




Figure 2: The priming manipulation used in at the top of the survey in Experiment 2B. Experiments 3 and 4 used only the control and flag conditions. The boxes measure 20.6mm x 14.3mm.

Figure 3




Figure 3. Desirability ratings of power-related words and images for those high (+1SD) and low (-1SD) in news exposure (Experiment 3).

Figure 4




Figure 4. Importance of high-status job attributes for those high (+1SD) and low (-1SD) in news exposure (Experiment 5).

Figure 5




Figure 5. Composite ratings of the Leadership test's validity, by feedback and prime conditions (Experiment 6). Error bars represent +/- 1SE of the mean.